Reframing reveals possibilities. This article highlights how conceptual shifts regarding ‘sustainability’ occurring inside China’s municipalities and major corporations are opening the way for new collaborations with technology companies and technology artists. These shifts – from predetermined accounting to systems thinking – reveal new opportunities to intervene in the biophysical and economic challenges facing China today. In companies, this shift implies placing financially relevant environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors at the core of business strategy. In municipalities, this shift necessitates designing (...) and implementing systems that track ecosystem services rather than simply stocks of natural resources and recognizing interdependencies between these services and economic development. This article suggests that this sustainability reframing can draw heavily on systems thinking from environmental science, technology companies’ drive to develop products that meet these emerging demands, corporations’ need to compete in an uncertain developing market and the reframing skills of artists, particularly digital artists. This article concludes with opportunities for digital artists to intervene and collaborate with sustainability practitioners to open new directions for cities and companies in China. (shrink)

This article examines the role of time as a methodological tool and pathological focus of clinical psychiatry and psychology in the first half of the 20th century. Contextualizing ‘psychopathologies of time’ developed by practitioners in Europe and North America with reference to the temporal theories implicit in Freudian psychoanalysis and Henri Bergson’s philosophy of durée, it illuminates how depression, schizophrenia, and other mental disorders such as obsessive-compulsive behaviours and aphasia were understood to be symptomatic of an altered or disturbed ‘time-sense’. (...) Drawing upon a model of temporal synthesis whereby in healthy individuals, a subjective temporal sense ( Ichzeit, durée, or personal lifetime) was perceived and understood in relation to objective time frameworks ( Weltzeit, clock-time, or quantitative time models like historical chronology), clinicians argued that mentally ill patients were unable to synthesize Ichzeit and Weltzeit, using variations in this disturbance to define specific pathological conditions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT What is the place of compassion in politics? For Hannah Arendt, compassion – a natural fellow-feeling for a suffering other – cannot be brought into politics without damaging both the feeling and the political realm. Arendt develops this analysis in the context of her critique of the French revolution, particularly its Jacobin episode. According to Arendt, the Jacobins attempted to keep the revolution’s compass fixed on unanimity and social cohesion by deploying a discourse of compassion. My reconstruction of Arendt’s (...) argument in On Revolution looks at how the Jacobins’ moralisation and politicisation of compassion not only destroyed the nascent space of politics in the revolution but introduced new ways of justifying cruelty. I go on to show the role that Jacobin compassion has played in the revolutionary tradition more broadly. Read thus, Arendt’s critique is not limited to the French revolution but targets a possibility that is present within the political culture of modernity – one that is activated whenever public action becomes equated with displaying virtuous pity for suffering groups. (shrink)

A large body of literature looks at how firms develop and maintain their reputation. Little is known, however, about factors leading to a damaged corporate reputation. In this article, the authors compare two sets of predictors of reputational damage following a reported breach of norms: the characteristics of the breach and the characteristics of the actor reporting the breach. Theoretically, the authors argue that the latter is likely to prevail over the former. The authors test this proposition in the highly (...) normative context of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Building on a global data set of over 8,600 CSR-related norm breaches, directed against 451 firms on the Fortune ranking reputation over the 2006-2009 period, the authors find empirical support for the idea that reputation damage is not really driven by the severity and novelty of the allegation, but by the type of source reporting the issue as well as the credibility of this source. Hence, these results lend some support to a socially constructed view of reputational damage, in which being portrayed by prominent actors as deviating from the norm is more important than the actual deviation from the goal of the norm itself. (shrink)

This paper aims to solve the following twofold problem. Suppose that a rational speaker, Ralph, mistakenly takes (for some reason) the Roman orator Cicero and the World War II German spy Cicero to be the same individual. By sincerely uttering the sentence “Cicero is an orator and a spy”, (a) does Ralph use the name “Cicero” of the Roman orator or the name “Cicero” of the German spy or another name of the genus “Cicero”? And (b) which Cicero does Ralph (...) refer to: the Roman orator, the German spy, both of them or neither of them? After drawing a distinction between the notion of mistaking one individual for another (exemplified by Kripke's “Jones”/“Smith” case and Putnam's “water”/“water” case) and the notion of wrongly taking two individuals to be one and the same individual (exemplified by the “Cicero”/“Cicero” case under discussion), I will defend the following solution to the last puzzling case: Ralph inadvertently creates an abstract individual playing the role of “fusion” or “amalgam” of the two Ciceros and also inadvertently creates a new name “Cicero” referring to such an individual. (shrink)

This manuscript focuses on a problem for Millian Russellianism raised by Fine : “[Assuming] that we are in possession of the information that a Fs and the information that a Gs, it appears that we are sometimes justified in putting this information ‘together’ and inferring that a both Fs and Gs. But how?” It will be my goal to determine a Millian-Russellian solution to this problem. I will first examine Nathan Salmon’s Millian-Russellian solution, which appeals to a non-semantic and subjective (...) notion of coordination defined in terms of guises. I will object that in order to convincingly solve a specific version of Fine’s problem, identity conditions for guises must be provided. On the other hand, the most plausible way to individuate guises is by means of the equivalence classes of coordination itself. But, if so, the guise-based strategy to solve Fine’s problem risks being circular; in addition, there are serious doubts that coordination is transitive. An alternative Millian-Russellian solution to Fine’s problem will then be explored, which gives up guises and employs, instead, a non-semantic and subjective relation of coordination not defined in terms of guises, along with occurrences of Russellian propositions of a special sort, for which identity conditions will be provided and via which token attitude states intuitively more fine-grained than guises will be individuated. (shrink)

Tentativa de expor o ecletismo filosófico estóico epicurista na obra de Horácio.

In his book Semantic Relationism, Kit Fine propounds an original and sophisticated semantic theory called ‘semantic relationism’ or ‘relational semantics’, whose peculiarity is the enrichment of Kaplan’s, Salmon’s and Soames’ Russellian semantics (more specifically, the semantic content of simple sentences and the truth-conditions of belief reports) with coordination, “the very strongest relation of synonymy or being semantically the same”. In this paper, my goal is to shed light on an undesirable result of semantic relationism: a report like “Tom believes that (...) Cicero is bald and Tom does not believe that Tully is bald” is correct according to Fine’s provided truth-conditions of belief reports, but its semantic content is (very likely) a contradiction. As I will argue in the paper, even the resort to the notion of token proposition, introduced in Fine’s recent article “Comments on Scott Soames’ ‘Coordination Problems’”, does not suffice to convincingly eliminate the contradiction; moreover, it raises new difficulties. (shrink)

This international collection of essays from the 2014 Hegel Society of America Meeting addresses three major stances in the decades-long controversy on the topic: Hegel as a full-blooded pre-critical metaphysician; Hegel as a thinker without metaphysics; and Hegel as a neo-Aristotelian metaphysician par excellence. This work successfully overcomes the stalemates between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’, ‘anti-metaphysical’ and ‘metaphysical’ Hegel.

This is the first complete, one-volume English translation of the ancient Chinese text Xunzi, one of the most extensive, sophisticated, and elegant works in the tradition of Confucian thought. Through essays, poetry, dialogues, and anecdotes, the Xunzi articulates a Confucian perspective on ethics, politics, warfare, language, psychology, human nature, ritual, and music, among other topics. Aimed at general readers and students of Chinese thought, Eric Hutton’s translation makes the full text of this important work more accessible in English than ever (...) before. Named for its purported author, the Xunzi has long been neglected compared to works such as the Analects of Confucius and the Mencius. Yet interest in the Xunzi has grown in recent decades, and the text presents a much more systematic vision of the Confucian ideal than the fragmented sayings of Confucius and Mencius. In one famous, explicit contrast to them, the Xunzi argues that human nature is bad. However, it also allows that people can become good through rituals and institutions established by earlier sages. Indeed, the main purpose of the Xunzi is to urge people to become as good as possible, both for their own sakes and for the sake of peace and order in the world. In this edition, key terms are consistently translated to aid understanding and line numbers are provided for easy reference. Other features include a concise introduction, a timeline of early Chinese history, a list of important names and terms, cross-references, brief explanatory notes, a bibliography, and an index. (shrink)

Millianism is the doctrine according to which the semantic content of a proper name is exhausted by its referent. This article raises and attempts to solve a dilemma for Millians: either a proper name of a truth bearer is in turn a truth bearer ; or having a truth bearer as semantic content is not sufficient for a linguistic expression to be a truth bearer. As it will be shown in the manuscript, the dilemma does not arise with “that”-clauses in (...) the place of proper names, if “that”-clauses are taken to be non-Millian designators whose semantic content is not a truth bearer. An account of “that”-clauses having such features and originating with Salmon, Frege's Puzzle, will be defended. (shrink)

The Stroop effect is a well-documented phenomenon, demonstrating both interference and facilitation effects. Many versions of the Stroop task were created, according to the purposes of its applications, varying in numerous aspects. While many versions are developed to investigate the mechanisms of the effect itself, the Stroop effect is also considered a general measure of attention, inhibitory control, and executive functions. In this paper, we implement “eStroop”: a new digital version based on verbal responses, measuring the main processes involved in (...) the traditional effect. eStroop features four categories of stimuli in four different colors: geometrical shapes, neutral words, congruent words, and incongruent words. The results of the administration to 307 University students confirm the Stroop effect and offer baseline data for future research and clinical testing. Direct comparisons with other recent versions of the task are discussed, offering insights into differences and similarities between different task variables. (shrink)

This paper will critically examine two solutions to Frege’s puzzle: the Millian-Russellian solution proposed by Salmon and Braun, which invokes non-semantic modes of presentation (guises, ways of believing or the like); and Fine’s relationalist solution, which appeals to semantic coordination. Special attention will be devoted to discussing the conception of modes of presentation as mental files and to elucidating the nature of coordination. A third solution to Frege’s puzzle will be explored which, like Salmon’s and Braun’s, adopts the Millian-Russellian semantics (...) but, like Fine’s, involves coordination instead of modes of presentation; however, coordination will not be conceived as a semantic relation but as a cognitive and subjective relation, which provides no contribution to semantic content. This novel Millian-Russellian account involving cognitive coordination will be labelled cognitive relationism. (shrink)

In his monograph Semantic Relationism, Kit Fine proposes two characterizations of coordination between proper names: an intuitive test; and a technical definition. The intuitive characterization is grounded in a notion of understanding distinct from the familiar notion of linguistic competence. Three prima facie appealing proposals to characterize this notion of understanding will be examined in the present paper and then dismissed as intrinsically implausible or as incompatible with Fine’s semantics. Not even his technical characterization of coordination, involving the notion of (...) semantic requirement, will enable us to escape the impasse. Ultimately, the question of what exactly coordination between names is will remain open. (shrink)

In his article “Opacity” (1986), David Kaplan propounded a counterexample to the the- sis, defended by Quine and known as Quine’s Theorem, that establishes the illegitimacy of quantifying from outside into a position not open to substitution. He ingeniously built his counterexample using Quine’s own philosophical material and novel devices, arc quotes and $entences. The present article offers detailed analysis and critical discus- sion of Kaplan’s counterexample and proposes a reasonable reformulation of Quine’s Theorem that bypasses both this counterexample and (...) another, in the author’s opinion, more persuasive counterexample, also discussed in this paper and somehow implicit in “Opacity”, which involves Russellian propositions instead of the Quinean apparatus. (shrink)

It is usually maintained that a subject with manifestly contradictory beliefs is irrational. How can we account, then, for the intuitive rationality of dialetheists, who believe that some manifest contradictions are true? My paper aims to answer this question. Its ultimate goal is to determine a characterization of (or rather a constraint for) rational belief approvable by both the theorists of Dialetheism and its opponents. In order to achieve this goal, a two-step strategy will be adopted. First, a characterization of (...) rational belief applicable to non-dialetheist believers will be determined; this characterization will involve the semantic apparatus of Nathan Salmon’s Millian Russellianism but will get rid of the problematic and obscure notion of mode of presentation (guise in his own terminology), replacing it with a couple of novel devices, belief subsystems and cognitive coordination. Second, using ideas from Graham Priest, the leading proponent of Dialetheism, such a characterization will be modified, so as to devise a new one able to account for the intuitive rationality of both dialetheist and non-dialetheist believers. (shrink)

The article expresses skepticism on the alleged affinity between Hegel’s theory of conceptuality and conceptual pragmatism. Despite the intriguing philosophical impetus underlying the latter, the author formulates doubts about its compatibility with logical and metaphysical principles of absolute idealism. The criticism is articulated in four theses: (1) pragmatism’s concerns with (ultimately empirical) concept-acquisition and concept-application are largely alien to Hegel’s logical-metaphysical theory of conceptuality; (2) the interchangeability of ‘word’ and ‘concept’ in the pragmatist discussion is incompatible with Hegel’s notion of (...) thinking; (3) the distinction of Vertsandesbestimmung and Vernunftbegriff, while ignored in practice in the pragmatist approach, is pivotal to Hegel’s understanding of the nature of conceptuality; (4) finally, pragmatism’s use of the recognition-thesis from the Phenomenology of Spirit ignores the noncontractarian, non-negotiative function of the same in Hegel’s work. (shrink)